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Commentary on
‘The Renegotiation of Contracts’*
Howard O Hunter
Professor John Carter has identified a theme of growing importance in
commercial transactions, especially as the number of those that are long in
duration and that cross political or cultural lines increases. It is difficult under
the best of circumstances ex ante to negotiate for all contingencies in a
dynamic economy. Allowing, or requiring, post hoc renegotiations every time
there is a change in circumstances could reduce substantially the utility of
contract as a risk allocation device that provides some measure of privately
ordered certainty unless the use of post hoc renegotiation is carefully
circumscribed.
We can put to one side those freely negotiated, arm’s length modifications,
which satisfy all the requirements of conventional contracting. Instead the
focus in this discussion is limited to those situations in which one party asserts
some lack of consent — whether by reason of duress, absence of consideration
or other unfairness — or those in which one or both parties seek relief from
a contract because of changes in the risk allocation. I also exclude those cases
in which there is excused non-performance, for example, impossibility,
frustration or mutual mistake, but focus on those in which non-performance
would be an unexcused breach.
As the sole representative from the United States at this seminar, I will
share some thoughts from cases and commentaries from across the Pacific.
First, I will note the somewhat peculiar, but ingenious use of implied
rescission as a way to support a renegotiation without new consideration.
Posit the following case: Company has an employment contract with
Executive that provides annual compensation of $X. Competitor offers
Executive $X + $N to leave Company and join Competitor. Executive says to
Company ‘I am leaving and breaching my contract because Competitor has
offered me $X + $N’. At that point, Company can say ‘OK’ and have a right
of action against Executive for breach of contract and perhaps against
Competitor for tortious interference with contract. The remedies would be:
• in some limited instances an injunction will lie to protect against the
loss of trade secrets or to enforce a restrictive covenant but the
benefits to Company are not likely to be great;1
* This is a commentary on a paper, appearing in this issue of the JCL, presented by Professor
John Carter at a seminar staged by the Committee for Postgraduate Studies, Faculty of Law,
University of Sydney in August 1997.
1 In general, American courts are reluctant to enforce restrictive covenants or prohibit a
departing employee from pursuing another job if to do so would constitute a serious
limitation on the individual’s free alienation of his labour. Limited restrictions will be upheld
to protect proprietary rights and short-term competitive interests. See generally H O Hunter,
Modern Law of Contracts, Rev ed, Warren, Gorham & Lamont Inc, New York, 1993,
para 22.02 and for a discussion of relevant case law see eg Metcalfe Invs, Inc v Garrison,
919 P2d 1356 (Alaska 1996).
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• difference in cost between current contract and new employee
contract net of savings from the departure of Executive, if any;
• perhaps something from Competitor if tortious interference is
proven.
The value of these remedies tends to be outweighed in most circumstances
by the transaction costs;2 and the time, energy and money expended in finding
a replacement for a senior executive are likely to be substantial. Thus
Company may say ‘Stay with us and we will match Competitor’s offer’. If the
Company later tries to renege, is it bound by the second promise?
The traditional answer was ‘no’. There is no new consideration and a
contract is a contract. A leading case was Davis & Company v Morgan,3 an
early 20th century decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. But the dominant
case and one that set the pattern for most 20th century US cases was
Schwartzreich v Bauman-Basch,4 a 1920s decision from New York. The
Schwartzreich court set up a hypothetical rescission followed by the
negotiation of a new contract. That is, the Executive’s statement about the
offer from Competitor was treated as an offer to rescind, which then was
‘accepted’ by Company, which then made a new offer to Executive which he
then accepted. Although a pure fiction, the Schwartzreich approach to the
enforceability of renegotiated contracts in which the only change is an
increase in consideration from one side has dominatedAmerican case law. The
approach of the Uniform Commercial Code (‘UCC’) — including proposed
revisions to the UCC — is essentially the same. A modification is enforceable
based upon the mutual exchange of promises.5
These cases and the UCC exemplify a pragmatic approach that is typical of
American commercial law. They also reflect an acceptance by the courts of the
vagaries of the marketplace and the shortcomings of contract remedies. It is all
well and good to talk of the ‘sanctity’ of contract, but if specific performance
is not available and the usual remedy for damages will leave the plaintiff with
large costs and not much real recovery, then a renegotiation may be the most
sensible course of action.
To shift to a different line of thinking, the development of the doctrine of
good faith may provide support for renegotiation. A long term contract may
well include a term stating that the parties will negotiate in good faith about
changes in various terms upon certain conditions, for example, passage of
time, substantial shifts in demand, or sudden price changes. A federal court
applying New Hampshire law recently held that an agreement to negotiate in
good faith is enforceable — that such an agreement has more certainty and
substance than an ‘agreement to agree’.6 The decision was in the context of
pre-contractual negotiations. A clause within an existing contract presumably
would have even more certainty.
The Howtek opinion was a long way from Judge Cardozo’s famous 1921
2 See generally, Hunter, above, n 1, para 18.02.
3 Davis & Company v Morgan, 117 Ga 504; 43 SE 732 (1903).
4 Schwartzreich v Bauman-Basch, Inc, 231 NY 196; 131 NE 887 (1921).
5 See UCC ss 2-209 and 2-210 of the proposed revisions to Art 2, American Law Institute
Discussion Draft, April 1997.
6 Howtek v Relisys, 958 F Supp 46 (DNH 1997).
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opinion in Sun Printing v Remington Paper.7 In that case a newsprint supplier
entered into a 16 month contract to supply newsprint to a chain of newspapers
— the chain established by the famous publisher Joseph Pulitzer. The contract
set the price for the first four months and then provided that the parties would
agree on prices to be charged thereafter capped by the ‘Canadian Export price’
— a published price akin to those available in the oil industry. The supplier
breached because the demand and the prices for paper went sky-high after
World War I. Sun tried to enforce the deal, but Judge Cardozo said it was too
vague and that it was akin to an ‘agreement to agree’. Cardozo’s opinion,
however, opened the door for a case such as Howtek and for the developing
doctrine of good faith. He remanded the case with an invitation to the plaintiff
to prove trade practices or course of performance that would add certainty to
the uncertain words of the contract.
Today, courts and the UCC make regular use of the evidence about course
of performance, trade practices, and course of dealing to add certainty to
otherwise vague or open-ended contract terms.8 If there has been a course of
performance or a prior history of dealing between the parties that has involved
renegotiation upon a change in circumstances, or if renegotiation is a common
practice within the trade, then it is possible that a reasonable effort at
renegotiation might be considered to be an implied term in an agreement, an
implied term that is itself then subject to the duty of good faith and — voila´
— we have a term that requires a good faith effort at renegotiation.
One can see some aspect of an implied duty of renegotiation in the
American law on anticipatory repudiation. Lawyers are familiar with the kinds
of statements or actions that can precipitate an anticipatory repudiation such
as an overt act or statement, or failure to deliver a critical instalment.9 But
what is interesting for this discussion is the obligation imposed by the UCC
on the non-repudiating party to request assurances of performance in many
instances before suing on the contract.10 The other party has to respond and if
there is no response, then there is a clear case of repudiation. This obligation
does not require any renegotiation; indeed, the non-repudiating party can
stand on the contract and demand its performance. But the rule pushes the two
parties together at a critical stage. A problem has developed and the law makes
the parties talk to each other. The result might be (i) clarification and
performance, (ii) clarification and non-performance, or (iii) renegotiation.
Whatever happens the law provides an incentive to encourage private ordering
before public intervention through the judicial system.
There is a similar approach among those cases that have to do with what is
known as de facto modification. Consider, for example, an instalment contract
that provides for performance at certain times and in certain ways. The
7 Sun Printing & Publishing Ass’n v Remington Paper & Power Co, 235 NY 338; 139 NE 470
(1923).
8 Two good recent examples are: Telecommunications Technology Corp v Deutsche Bank SG,
652 NYS 2d 291 (AD 1997); Hall v Custom Craft Fixtures, Inc, 1997 WL 300241 (Wash
App 1997).
9 See eg Thunder Basin Coal Co v Southwestern Pub Serv Co, 1997 WL 3661 (10th Cir
1997); Menella v Kurt E Schon EAI, Ltd, 979 F2d 357 (5th Cir 1992); AEL Indus Inc, v
Loral Fairchild Corp, 882 F Supp 1477 (ED Pa 1995).
10 See UCC s 2-609 and see s 251, Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981).
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performer breaches repeatedly with minor delays or variations but the other
party does not complain. Before the other party can complain, he must give
notice that in the future he will demand strict adherence.11 Otherwise he is
bound by repeated acceptances of non-conforming goods. Again, this rule
forces the parties to communicate before claiming default.
Finally, it may be useful to look at the subject of renegotiation from the
perspective of property law with a nod to restitution. I borrow heavily from
ideas developed by Professor Fred S McChesney, who is both a lawyer and an
economist in a paper that has not yet been published.12 Professor
McChesney’s paper examines the apparent contradiction between the doctrine
of efficient breach and the tort of interference with contract. If it is not tortious
for A to breach his contract with B, and, if indeed, such action is economically
efficient because it moves A’s performance to a higher valuing user in a way
that is Pareto optimal, then why can B sue C for tortious interference if C
induced A to breach by offering more for his services? Are not the concepts
antithetical? McChesney examines the writing of numerous commentators,
and ultimately concludes that the answer lies in the recognition of contract as
property — and, one might add, in the realisation that efficient breach is
theoretical more than real. (There are too many variables for efficient breach
to mean much in most cases, and among repeat players, the costs of being
known as a breacher usually outweigh any short-term gain to be derived from
the breach.)
Contract rights are bought, sold, assigned, and used as collateral. The
concept of property is alive and well within contract. It provides a useful basis
for analysing restitutionary claims in contract settings. Of interest to this
discussion is the use of property as a different paradigm for the analysis of the
parties’ relationships. In McChesney’s approachA and B as contracting parties
each ‘owns’ property rights — rights that may be ‘taken’ by the other’s breach.
Renegotiation would avoid a private ‘taking’ and would sustain the private
ordering mechanisms that make contract such a vital and important force in a
market economy.
Private discussions with some scholars who are working in restitution, most
notably Professor Andrew Kull who is Reporter for a new American Law
Institute project on restitution, suggest yet another angle on the concept of
efficient breach that might be of interest in considering renegotiation. If C is
willing to pay B more for his services than A to whom B is contractually
bound and if A can be said to have a property right in the performance of the
A–B contract, then the gain that B makes from the breach might be
characterised as a gain from the private ‘taking’ of A’s property right in the
contract surplus. Assume, for example, that A had agreed to pay B $100 for
services that would cost B $80 to perform. A values the services at $100, and
B is (at first) happy with a profit of $20. There is, however, a higher-valuing
user, C, who is willing to pay B $150 for the same services. If both A and B
11 See eg Exxon Corp v Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd, 40 F3d 1474 (5th Cir 1995). (Rote
recitation of acceptance of nonconforming performance for several years with no attempt to
compel adherence constituted a waiver; in effect, a de facto modification.)
12 A copy of the manuscript is on file with the author. Professor McChesney is a member of the
faculty of the Cornell University Law School in Ithaca, New York.
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have property interests in performance of the A–B contract, then to whom
does the surplus ‘belong’? Absent an anti-assignment clause A probably could
assign A’s interest in the contract to C for $50 and B would have no claim, but
might there be a different approach in cases of breach? At present the case law
clearly holds that B can breach subject only to the payment of damages to A
measured by the difference in the contract price and the cost to A of having the
services provided by a third party, limited by rules of reasonableness and
mitigation. Nevertheless, a mixture of property and restitution analysis might
provide a fresh approach to the consideration of ways in which private
re-ordering might be preferred when doing so might serve goals of efficiency,
justice and certainty.
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